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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The current appeal originates from a Verified Petition for a Protective Order filed November 
21, 2003 R 1 It constitutes the latest installment in a long and bitter divorce proceeding between 
Appellee and Appellant Civil #024902228 DA Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City Dept 
As a result of the petition an Ex Parte Protective Order was issued and served on Mr 
Cline R 17, R 31 A hearing on the protective order was held on December 12, 2003 and a portion of 
that hearing is included in the Transcript on Appeal R 77 The Protective Order was entered on 
December 17, 2003 and Mr Clme appealed the Order on December 19, 2003 R35 
On December 17, 2003 there was a hearing on a Motion to Modify Temporary Orders This 
motion was filed in the underlying divorce action Although the motion and its accompanying 
documents, including any responsive memoranda, are not a part of the record on this appeal, Mr Clme 
has included the Order relating to the hearing, entered January 22, 2004, as part of his appendix to his 
Brief Brief of Appellant Appendix pg 18 Likewise, Mr Clme has included a copy of his Motion to 
Amend Judgment and or Order dated January 12, 2004 and a Petition for Extraordinary writ dated 
February 11, 2004 as part of his Exhibits These documents are apparently for purposes of providing 
proof of the raising of these issues before the trial court The issues addressed are identified as Issues 
5 and 6 to Mr Clmes Appeal 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1 Julie Camp (Ms Camp) and Earl Clme II (Mr Clme) were formerly husband and wife R 1 
2 The parties have been involved m a long and acrimonious divorce T 19 
3 Mr Clme was incarcerated for his failure to abide by Court orders m the the underlying divorce 
proceeding T 18 
4 Upon his release from jail, Mr Clme contacted Ms Camp by telephone During the 
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conversation Ms Camp asked Mr Cline his intentions, to which he replied "Why, are you 
afraid I'm going to come and beat you up9" T 18 
5 Mr Chne's statement in conjunction with his previous behavior left Ms Camp in fear of 
imminent physical harm T 25 
6 Based on these facts the Trial Court entered a permanent protective order against Mr 
Clme T 25 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr Cline and Ms Camp are former husband and wife After a stormy marriage, they entered 
into a long and acrimonious divorce proceeding Within the context of this situation Mr Clme made 
statements which Ms Camp perceived were threats to cause her imminent physical harm As a result 
of those threats, and Mr Clmes actions, Ms Camp filed an Ex Parte motion for a Protective Order 
That motion was granted Subsequently a hearing was held before Judge Hilder for purposes of 
entering a permanent protective order Ms Camp's request was granted and a permanent protective 
order was entered on December 17, 2003 Mr Cline Filed his Appeal of that Order on December 19, 
2003 
In his appeal Mr Clme purports to raise six issues The first two issues attack the propriety of 
the ex parte protective order That order is not however the order which Mr Clme has appealed from 
and indeed that order became moot with the entiy of the permanent protective order Even were the 
two issues still somehow relevant, Mr Clines arguments are not well taken His first issue alleges that 
the Petition for ex parte protective order (the "Petition") was not verified However Mr Clme seems 
to have mixed up the verification and the notarization of the document The Petition was verified 
before it was filed, it was however not notarized until a day later This is a minor ministerial matter, 
not addressed by the statute, and is therefore irrelevant to the order being appealed from in this case 
-4_ 
Mr Clme's concern in his second issue, that Ms Camp did not set forth the lengthy list of Court 
proceedings involving Mr Cline in her Petition should be dismissed for the same reasons It is 
irrelevant and not statutorily required for issuance of the ex parte order and certainly irrelevant to the 
issuance of the order being appealed from here 
Mr Clme's third and fourth issues addressed evidentiary questions relating to the hearing on 
the protective order The initial problem with Mr Cline's arguments are his failure to marshal the 
evidence The only portion of the hearing on the protective order reduced to Transcript is the portion 
involving Mr Cline's argument and the Court's response thereto Accordingly Mr Clme cannot and 
did not show that he objected to any evidence and indeed has failed to even identify what specific 
admitted evidence he objects to Since Mr Clme has failed to meet his duties under the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure his brief and appeal should be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to Rule 24 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 
In any event, Mr Clme's argument should be dismissed as it is simply irrelevant The Court's 
ruling was clearly based on events that had transpired since the last protective order hearing between 
the parties Accordingly there could be no prejudice from any of the alleged prior rulings 
Like the first two issues, Mr Clines final two issues are not relevant to this appeal The first 
seems to be an allegation that Mr Cline has been discriminated against because his prior attempts to 
obtain protective orders against Ms Camp were denied, while she was granted one here If Mr Clme 
had a problem with the denial of his protective orders, he should have appealed the decisions denying 
them It is to late for him to try and circumvent the time for requesting appellate review by raising the 
issue here In any event, there is no record as part of this appeal that even addresses this issue let alone 
that justifies it 
Mr Clines final issue is a claim that Ms Camp's trial counsel should be disqualified Again 
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this issue was not a part of the order appealed from here It was addressed separately m the underlying 
divorce action and was heard in a hearing after the entry of this order Jurisdictionally it is therefore 
improper to raise it now In any event Mr Cline has again failed to marshal the record as required 
There is no transcript of the hearing where this issue was heard and there is no copy of the Order 
resulting from that hearing that is part of the official record on appeal Accordingly the Trial Court's 
ruling on this issue cannot be disturbed and Mr Cline's argument fails 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE VERIFIED PETITION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER WAS PROPERLY VERIFIED. 
The Petitioner/ Appellee, Julie Cline Camp (hereafter ccMs Camp") filed a Verified Petition 
for Protective Order with the Third District Court pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse Act UCA §30-
6-1 et seq R 1 UCA §30-6-4(4) of the Act states "A petition for an order of protection shall be m 
writing and verified " 
The Respondent/Appellant, Earl L Cline II (hereafter "Mr Clme") alleges as is first issue 
that Ms Camp's Petition was not verified according to the Statute Appellant's Brief pg 7 He does 
not address this issue in the Argument section of his Brief, however in the Summary of Argument 
section he states "Mr Clme argues numerous blatant errors were made by Julie m filling out the 
forms, including failing to have the Petition for protective order "verified", until after the order was 
signed by the Judge " Appellant's Brief pg 17 
A review of the Petition shows that Ms Camp verified the Petition on November 20, 2003 
the same day the Ex Parte Protective Order was signed R 16, R The Petition was not notarized or 
filed until November 21, 2003 R 16 It was filed November 21, 2001, the same day it was 
notarized The order was served on Mr Cline on November 25, 2003 R 31 
Initially, it should be noted that Mr Cline's challenge to the sufficiency of the Petition is not 
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found anywhere m the record of this Appeal including the Partial Transcript of the hearing Issues 
not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal Walker v Hansen, 74 P 3d 635 640 
(Ut App 2003) The argument should therefore be dismissed summarily 
Next, it should be noted, the argument is irrelevant The argument goes to the validity of 
the original Ex Parte Protective Order That Order was superceded by the Protective Order entered 
by the Court on December 17, 2003, after the evidentiary hearing The ex parte order (from which 
Mr Chne has filed no appeal) having been superceded, any issues regarding it are now moot 
The argument is in any event without merit Mr Chne seems to confuse verification and 
notarization Ms Camp was the party who "verified" the Petition while the clerk of the court was 
the party who "notarized" Ms Camp's verification Nothing m the statute requires that the 
notarization be performed prior to the issuance of the Order Since the Verification was made at the 
time the Petition was prepared, the Court's Ex Parte Order was issued appropriately 
II. WAS THE PETITION FOR EX PARTE PROTECTIVE ORDER PROPERLY 
COMPLETED. 
This issue, like Issue I above, was not raised at the trial court level and applies only to the 
Ex Parte Order, not the actual protective order that is being appealed here Just like Issue I it should 
be dismissed for not being raised and for mootness Also like Issue I the argument itself is without 
merit 
Mr Chne complains that Ms Camp did not complete paragraph #7 at page 4 of the Verified 
Petition for Ex Parte Protective Order Nothing m the Statute however requires the completion of 
that section UCA §30-6-4 (l)(b) identifies the matters that are required to be included in the forms 
Identification of other proceedings is not one of those items UCA §30-6-4 1 does require "each 
party" to inform the court at any hearing in a proceeding to obtain an order for protection, of all 
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cases involving either party " It makes it clear however that the protective order is in addition to 
and not in lieu of any other such proceeding and further that a petitioner is not barred and the court 
should not delay in granting a protective order simply because of the existence of other proceedings 
The Court in this case was apprized of and/or already aware of the other litigation involving the 
parties to this protective order The failure to fill in paragraph 7 on the Petition was therefore 
irrelevant 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPERMISSIBLY ADMIT EVIDENCE 
Mr Chne's third issue is a claim that the trial court impermissibly admitted evidence barred 
by UCA §78-7-19 or the "legal principle of Res Judicata " Appellant's Brief pg 8 
UCA §78-7-19 states "If an application for an order, made to a judge of a court in which 
the action or proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in part or is granted conditionally, a 
subsequent application for the same order may not be made to any other judge, except of a higher 
court" 
Mr Clme asserts that a number of the allegations contained m the Petition had been 
previously litigated and decided in his favor Nowhere m the record however is a copy of any such 
finding Indeed the only direct reference to be found is m the partial transcript at pg 12 The tnal 
court reviewed a minute entry denying a previous request for a protective order, but did not find a 
signed order creating an effect of Res Judicata It was the responsibility of Mr Clme to include any 
items m this appeal as are necessary for this Court's consideration of the Appeal Mr Chne's 
failure to do so is fatal to this argument (See VII below ) 
Mr Chne's argument must also be rejected based on his failure to show that he made a 
timely objection to the evidence allegedly presented In State v Dommguez, 72 P 3d 127 (Utah 
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App 2003) this Court held "the grounds for an objection must be distinctly and specifically stated " 
Id at 130 Mr Chne has failed to include the portion of the hearing wherein the evidence was 
allegedly presented and cannot therefore meet his burden of demonstrating that such objection was 
even made let alone that it was made properly 
Where no objection was properly made Mr Chne is forced to show that the Court's 
admission of evidence is plain error State v Dominguez at 130 
To establish plain error, Defendant must show (I) an error exists, (n) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and (in) the error is harmful, l e , absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant 
State v Dommguez at 130 
Mr Chne has failed to establish any of these three criteria Indeed he has not even 
addressed them with any reasoned analysis based upon any relevant legal authority and therefore 
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the argument should be dismissed 
State v Sloan, 72 P 3d 138, 141-142 (Utah App 2003) 
Even the most cursory review of the limited record provided by Mr Chne shows his claim 
to be without merit Judge Hilder went out of his way to explain to Mr Chne that the only items he 
was considering were current issues regarding the protective order He stated the issues regarding 
contempt were not being considered (T 5-T 6) He explained to Mr Chne that he wanted to focus 
on the allegations that had occurred since the last motion for protective order (T 9-T 10) In 
examining those issues, the Court found and Mr Chne admitted making a comment to Ms Camp 
"What, are you afraid I'm going to come and beat you up9" T 18 
Judge Hilder construed that comment in the light of the history of the parties, he stated 
I know you differ - both of you - on every issue that's occurred between you since the 
beginning of time, but nevertheless, we've seen the history, and it's a long history I've 
seen history in this courtroom, and that's part of the problem The climate of hostility of 
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escalation creates a world where something that may otherwise sounded innocent does not 
seem innocent 
T19 
The Court went on to state 
protective orders have been designed by the legislature to give people some peace of mind 
and some protection if they are threatened, are abused in any way in a domestic violence 
sense or under reasonable apprehension of physical harm 
Although a lot of these incidents are old, although quite a few of them I agree do not amount 
to cohabitant abuse, in the totality, in the climate that has been created by both of you - I 
mean this is not- it takes more than one person to create this climate But within this 
climate the things yo have done - some of the things you have said, including specifically 
the comments after your release from jail the first time could reasonably be construed in this 
Court's opinion as threats or intimidation that is simply prohibited by the cohabitant abuse 
statute 
Based on that I find there is a basis for issuance of a protective order 
T 24-T 25 
The protective order was issued therefore upon the basis of the threat of physical violence, 
which threat had been made after all of the other proceedings Mr Cline alluded to were long 
completed Mr Clines unsupported and unsubstantiated argument must therefore be dismissed 
IV. MR. CLINES'S ACTIONS PROVIDE ADEQUATE BASIS FOR THE PROTECTIVE 
ORDER. 
In his fourth issue, Mr Cline argues that his actions did not constitute a threat of imminent 
physical harm and that his actions did not nse to the level of a criminal offense and that unless such 
actions were criminal they could not support a claim for a protective order 
In its ruling, the Trial Court made it clear that upon all the evidence presented it found Mr 
Cline's "question" to Ms Camp of whether she was afraid he was going to beat her up m the overall 
context of this hotly contested divorce proceeding to constitute a threat of imminent physical harm 
"The appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity and should defer to 
the tnal court m factual matters " Bailey v Bayles, 52 P 3d 1158, 1164 (Utah 2002) ("It is the trial 
-10-
court's role to assess witness credibility, given its advantaged position to observe testimony first 
hand, and normally, we will not second guess the trial court's findings in this regard " Promax 
Development Corp. v Mattson, 943 P 2d 247, 255 (Utah App), cert denied, 953 P 2d 449 (Utah 
1997)) This ruling by the Trial Court is in harmony with Utah case law interpreting the cohabitant 
abuse statute 
In Bailey v Bayles 52 P 3d 1158 (Utah 2002) the Supreme Court stated that in order for a 
person to obtain a protective order " she was required to show that she was a cohabitant and either 
that she had been subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or that there was a substantial likelihood 
of immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence to her " Bailey at 1165 
Mr Clme latches onto the term "imminent" in the statute to try and defeat the Trial Court's 
finding He points to the fact that he was ten miles away and making the threat by phone to defeat 
the Court's ruling However the Supreme Court in Bailey found that a threat of harm made 18 
months prior to the Motion for protective order met the criterion and this Court in Strollo v Strollo, 
828 P 2d 532 (Utah App 1992) found that a threat uttered seven months prior to the protective 
order met the statutory requirements The test under the statute is not when and where the threat 
was made, but whether under all of the surrounding circumstances the threat reasonably left the 
victim with the fear that she was in danger of imminent harm Judge Hilder found that Mr Clmes 
statement constituted such a threat m this case 
V. MR. CLINE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED IN THIS CASE. 
Mr Clme's fifth stated issue is a claim that his constitutional rights have been violated. 
While it is unclear from the rambling discourse in Appellant's Brief it appears that the claim is that 
Mr Clme is asserting his rights to equal protection have been violated because his two attempts at 
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obtaining a protective order against Ms Camp were unsuccessful, while she was granted a 
protective order here The Complaint therefore is in the denial of Mr Clmes previous requests for 
protective orders Those prior orders are not befoie this Court Juris diction ally those claims are 
barred as they were not appealed within the time allotted by the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
The simple issue here is whether under the facts of this case Ms Camp is entitled to relief 
under the Cohabitant Abuse Statute As demonstrated above she is entitled to relief and the Trial 
Court so found Mr Clines statements as to what he alleges entitled him to prior relief under the 
protective order statute are not part of the record of this appeal and should be stricken as 
unsupported Issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal Walker v 
Hansen, 74 P 3d 635, 640 (Utah App 2003) Clearly if the prior adjudicating body had found the 
claims to have been of merit the requested relief would have been granted It can therefore only be 
presumed that the allegations were found to be without merit This issue should accordingly be 
dismissed 
VI. THE ISSUE OF MR. WALL'S DISQUALIFICATION IS NOT PART OF THIS 
APPEAL. 
Mr Clme's final purported issue revolves around the Trial Court's refusal to disqualify Ms 
Camp's attorney Steven Wall from representing her, based on what Mr Clme claims is a conflict of 
interest Mr Clme identifies this issue as having been addressed at a hearing ct[s]everal days after 
this hearing" 
A review of the record in the underlying divorce action discloses the hearing was held on 
December 17, 2003 The order relating to that hearing was not filed until January 22, 2004, over a 
month after this appeal was filed Mr Cline Proceeded to file a Petition for an Extraordinary writ 
with the Utah Court of Appeals seeking to have the order of January 22nd overturned That Petition 
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was denied in a Memorandum Decision dated March 25, 2004 R 72 In the Memorandum 
Decision, the Court pointed out that Mr Cline needed to have resolved this issue with a direct 
appeal of the Court's order or by an interlocutory appeal of the same Mr Clme has undertaken 
neither action and instead has inappropriately tried to piggy back his appeal of the January 22, 2004 
Order into this his appeal filed December 19 2003 As the Order was entered m a different case at 
a time after this Appeal was filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter 
Even if this Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, it should be summarily dismissed 
The transcript of the hearing wherein the issue was addressed is not part of the record of this appeal 
The failure to complete the record makes it impossible for this Court to address Mr Clme's 
challenges to the Trial Court's explicit findings as set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision 
of March 25, 2004 R 72 Those findings cannot be disturbed and accordingly Mr Clme's 
challenge is without merit 
VII. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED BASED ON HIS FAILURE TO 
PROPERLY MARTIAL THE EVIDENCE. 
In this action Mr Cline refers to events m at least two hearings The first hearing was an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of Ms Camp's request for a protective order That hearing was 
held December 12, 2003 Mr Clme apparently requested only a partial transcript of the hearing and 
that partial transcript is the transcript m the record for this appeal 
The second hearing was held December 17, 2003 It was that hearing that addressed Mr 
Clme's attempt to disqualify Mr Wall and which may have addressed some of Mr Clme's 
constitutional claims Mr Clme has not requested a transcript of that hearing and there is no such 
transcript as part of the record 
The trial court made specific findings and ruling as part of both hearings To successfully 
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challenge the trial court's findings Mr Cline must demonstrate that the findings are erroneous To 
make such a showing, he must martial all of the evidence supporting the finding, and then 
demonstrate how this evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, is 
insufficient to support it Fisher v Fisher, 907 P 2d 1172, 1177 (Utah App 1995) Not only has 
Mr Cline failed to martial all the evidence but he has failed to even order the necessary transcripts 
to martial the evidence Due to the Mr Cline's failure to martial the evidence, this court should not 
disturb the factual findings on the trial court Beesleyv Harris, 883 P 2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994) 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal is simply another action by a contumacious litigant with a zest for participating 
in the proceedings of the Court while ignoring the Court's orders and his obligations thereunder 
T 34-T 35 The record is so woefully inadequate that this Court should summarily dismiss the 
Appeal on that basis alone The limited record available shows clearly that Mr Cline is not entitled 
to the relief he has requested and that the Trial Court's ruling granting the protective order was 
proper Mr Clines final two issues are not even issues properly included m this Appeal Instead 
they should have been appealed from the original divorce proceeding and from the orders directly 
affecting them Finally, Mr Cline's Brief is not in compliance with Rule 24 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and therefore it can be and should be stricken Sua Sponte Ms Camp therefore 
respectfully requests Mr Cline's Appeal be denied and that she be awarded her costs m having to 
respond thereto 
DATED this 15th day of July, 2004 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY 
Shawn D Turner 
-14-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of July, 2004 a true and correct copy of Brief of 
Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following 
Earl Chne II 
1565 East 7200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Westlaw 
UT ST § 30-6-1 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-6-1 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 6. COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 
30-6-1 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause a 
cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing a cohabitant in 
reasonable fear of imminent physical harm. 
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1 or a 
person who is 16 years of age or older who: 
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party; 
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party; 
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party; 
(d) has one or more children in common with the other party; 
(e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child; or 
(f) resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include: 
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent to 
a minor; or 
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or foster siblings 
Copr. @ West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UT ST § 30-6-1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-6-1 
Page 2 
who are under 18 years of age. 
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk. 
(5) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is defined in Section 77-
36-1. 
(6) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued without notice to the 
defendant in accordance with this chapter. 
(7) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order issued by another 
state, territory, or possession of the United States, tribal lands of the 
United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia 
which shall be given full faith and credit in Utah, if the protective order is 
similar to a protective order issued in compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, 
Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures 
Act, and includes the following requirements: 
(a) the requirements of due process were met by the issuing court, 
including subject matter and personal jurisdiction; 
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and 
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hearing regarding the 
protective order. 
(8) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement agency" means any public agency 
having general police power and charged with making arrests in connection with 
enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances of this state or any 
political subdivision. 
(9) "Peace officer" means those persons specified in Title 53, Chapter 13, 
Peace Officer Classifications. 
(10) "Protective order" means an order issued pursuant to this chapter 
subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner and 
respondent have been given notice in accordance with this chapter. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 6. COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 
30-6-4 Forms for petitions and protective orders --Assistance. 
(1) (a) The offices of the court clerk shall provide forms and nonlegal 
assistance to persons seeking to proceed under this chapter. 
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform 
forms for petitions and orders for protection in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter on or before September 1, 1995. That office shall 
provide the forms to the clerk of each court authorized to issue protective 
orders. The forms shall include: 
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex parte protective order 
that knowing falsification of any statement or information provided for 
the purpose of obtaining a protective order may subject the petitioner to 
felony prosecution; 
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation of 
which is a criminal offense, and a separate portion for those provisions, 
the violation of which is a civil violation, as provided in Subsection 
30-6-4.2(5) ; 
(iii) language in the criminal provision portion stating violation of any 
criminal provision is a class A misdemeanor, and language in the civil 
portion stating violation of or failure to comply with a civil provision 
is subject to contempt proceedings; 
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to provide to 
facilitate identification of the respondent, such as social security 
number, driver license number, date of birth, address, telephone number, 
and physical description; 
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific period of time for 
the civil provisions to be in effect, not to exceed 150 days, unless the 
petitioner provides in writing the reason for the requested extension of 
the length of time beyond 150 days; 
Copr. ® West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UT ST § 30-6-4 Page 2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-6-4 
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when a minor child is 
included in an ex parte protective order or a protective order, as part of 
either the criminal or the civil portion of the order, the petitioner may 
provide a copy of the order to the principal of the school where the child 
attends; and 
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the respondent fails to 
return custody of a minor child to the petitioner as ordered in a 
protective order, the petitioner may obtain from the court a writ of 
assistance. 
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by an 
attorney, it is the responsibility of the court clerk's office to provide: 
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1); 
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for protection 
including, but not limited to, forms for service; 
(c) clerical assistance in filling out the forms and filing the petition, in 
accordance with Subsection (1) (a) . A court clerk's office may designate any 
other entity, agency, or person to provide that service, but the court clerk's 
office is responsible to see that the service is provided; 
(d) information regarding the means available for the service of process; 
(e) a list of legal service organizations that may represent the petitioner in 
an action brought under this chapter, together with the telephone numbers of 
those organizations; and 
(f) written information regarding the procedure for transporting a jailed or 
imprisoned respondent to the protective order hearing, including an 
explanation of the use of transportation order forms when necessary. 
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, or law enforcement 
agency for: 
(a) filing a petition under this chapter; 
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order; 
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(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for service 
or delivery to law enforcement officials, or 
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective order, or protective 
order 
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified 
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form adopted by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1). 
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued ex parte, shall include 
the following language: 
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the 
hearing that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1994, P.L 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is 
valid in all the United States, the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and 
United States territories." 
History: C 1953, 30-6-4, enacted by L. 1979, ch. Ill, § 4; 1983, ch. 113, § 1 ; 
1989, ch. 32, § 3; 1993, ch. 137, § 6; 1995, ch. 300, § 5; 1996, ch. 244, § 4, 
1997, ch. 10, § 34. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, rewrote the section. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29r 1996, added Subsections (1)(b)(n) to 
(l)(b)(vn), (2) (f) and (5) (b) , making a related designation change; subdivided 
Subsection (1) (b) adding the (1) (b) (l) designation; in Subsection (2) (e) 
substituted "petitioner" for "plaintiff"; in Subsection (3) substituted "law 
enforcement agency" for "county sheriff"; added Subsection (5)(b); and made 
stylistic changes. 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, updated the code section reference in 
Subsection (1) (b) (n) . 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE 
CHAPTER 6. COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 
30-6-4.1 Continuing duty to inform court of other proceedings --Effect of 
other proceedings. 
(1) At any hearing in a proceeding to obtain an order for protection, each party 
has a continuing duty to inform the court of each proceeding for an order for 
protection, any civil litigation, each proceeding in juvenile court, and each 
criminal case involving either party, including the case name, the file number, 
and the county and state of the proceeding, if that information is known by the 
party. 
(2) (a) An order for protection issued pursuant to this chapter is in addition 
to and not in lieu of any other available civil or criminal proceeding. 
(b) A petitioner is not barred from seeking a protective order because of 
other pending proceedings. 
(c) A court may not delay granting relief under this chapter because of the 
existence of a pending civil action between the parties. 
(3) A petitioner may omit his or her address from all documents filed with the 
court under this chapter, but shall separately provide the court with a mailing 
address that is not to be made part of the public record, but that may be provided 
to a peace officer or entity for service of process. 
History: C. 1953, 30-6-4.1, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 300, § 6; 1998, ch. 282, § 13. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "peace 
officer" for "constable or other law enforcement officer" in Subsection (3). 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. Courts 
CHAPTER 2a. COURT OF APPEALS 
78-2a-3 Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board 
of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by 
the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the 
state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
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(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging 
the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 
1988, ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 
1990, ch. 224, § 3; 1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, ch. 13, § 45; 
1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch. 255, § 
20; 2001, Ch. 302, § 2. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. Courts 
CHAPTER 7. GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES 
7 8-7-19 Repeated application for orders forbidden. 
(1) If an application for an order, made to a judge of a court in which the action 
or proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in part or is granted 
conditionally, a subsequent application for the same order may not be made to any 
other judge, except of a higher court. 
(2) This section does not apply to motions refused for any informality in the 
papers or proceedings necessary to obtain the order, or to motions refused with 
liberty to renew them. 
(3) A notice of appeal for a trial de novo is not a subsequent application for the 
same order. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp. , 104-7-19; L. 1988, ch. 73, § 6; 
1996, ch. 198, § 64. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Changed circumstances. 
-- Summary judgment. 
Relief from default judgment. 
Changed circumstances. 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
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Current with amendments received through 2-01-04 
RULE 24 BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The bnef of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and m the order 
indicated 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the bnef where they are cited 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority, and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of 
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth m an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule 
(7) A statement of the case The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations 
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule 
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of 
the arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which 
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the argument is arranged 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph The 
addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick If the addendum 
is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents The addendum shall contain a copy of 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited m the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim m the brief, 
(B) m cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion, m all cases any court opinion 
of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service, 
and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as 
the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
rule, except that the appellee need not include 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant, or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant The appellee may 
refer to the addendum of the appellant 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has 
cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief m reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the 
cross-appeal Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth m the opposing bnef The 
content of the reply bnef shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No 
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected m their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a 
minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee " It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive 
terms such as "the employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to pages of published depositions or transcnpts shall identify the 
sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each 
separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber 
References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of 
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, 
offered, and received or rejected 
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(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply 
briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any 
addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule 
In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal 
shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages m length The brief of the 
appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved m the cross-appeal as well as the answer 
to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages m length The appellant shall then file a brief which 
contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's 
response to the issues raised m the appellant's opening brief The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 
pages m length The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which 
contains only a reply to the appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda and 
may be exceeded only by permission of the court The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or 
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join m a single brief, 
and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another Parties may similarly join m 
reply briefs 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a 
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nme copies shall be filed 
in the Supreme Court An original letter and seven copies shall be filed m the Court of Appeals There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall 
without argument state the reasons for the supplemental citations Any response shall be made within 7 days of 
filing and shall be similarly limited 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically 
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court 
may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer 
[Amended effective July 1, 1994, April 1, 1995, April 1, 1998, November 1, 1999, April 1, 2003 ] 
Advisory Committee Note 
Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held See In re Beesley, 883 P 2d 1343, 1349 
(Utah 1994), Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) "To successfully appeal a trial court's 
findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate 'must extricate from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position In order to properly discharge the duty , the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists' " ONEIDA/SLIC, v ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc, 872 P2d 1051, 
1052-53 (Utah App 1994) (alteration in onginal)(quotmg West Valley City v Majestic Inv Co , 818 P 2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App 1991)) See also State ex rel MS v Salata, 806 P 2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App 1991), Bell v 
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Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and 
citation of supporting authority. 
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